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CURRENT DECISIONS
remedy -an unfair labor practice wich is in violaton.-of the Act."
However, it has at times declined to exercise its jurisdicftin to deal with
unfair labor practices where federal labor policy would best be served
by leaving the parties to other processes of law 9
The holding of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Strong20 has served
to modify the authority of the Board by enlarging the base from which
"affirmative action" as provided in Section 160 (c) to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act may be taken.2l Although specific reference is made
therein only to remuneration for prior services, the fact that fringe, bene-
fits do not constitute direct compensation was not considered fatal to
the issue.22 Such benefits are receivable in addition to direct compen-
sation, and an unfair labor practice may cause pecuniary loss to an em-
ployee in both areas. Thus, once an employer's action is determined to
be an unfair labor practice, the Board may now take remedial action by
ordering payment of lost fringe benefits, considered now to constitute
"back pay" 23
NICHOLAS STUART REYNOLDS
Federal Criminal Procedure-HABEAs CORPUS PROCEDURES-DIs-
CRETION To DENY SuCCESsIVE HABEAS CORPUS APPLICATIONS WITH-
OUT A HEARING. Hilbrnch v. Unted States, 406 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.
1969)
In 1963 petitioner was convicted of bank robbery His appeal,
based on the contention that he was not brought before the United
States Commissioner with the requisite dispatch, and that his confession
18. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962). It should be noted
that Congress established the judicial remedy of 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), in lieu of a
proposal to make breach of a collective bargaining agreement itself an unfair labor
practice. Textile Workers Umon v. Lincoln Mills, 353 US. 448, 452 (1957). See
Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section
301, 66 YALE L.J. 167 (1956).
19. In Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), the Board recognized the
arbitrator's award m an attempt to encourage voluntary settlement of labor disputes.
In Consolidated Aircraft Corp, 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943), the Board refused to exercise
jurisdiction where the parties had not exhausted their rights and remedies under the
contract.
20. 393 US. 357 (1969).
21. In a recent case, the court alluded to NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969), to
affirm the authority of the Board to determine back pay due wronged employees.
NLRB v. K & H Specialties Co, Inc, 407 F.2d 820 (6th Cir. 1969).
22. 393 U.S. at - n.4.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
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should not have been admitted, was denied.' He then, moved under 28
U.S.C. § 22552 that his sentence be vacated and set aside on the ground
that he had been promsed punishment sinilar to that received by a
codefendant. His motion was denied without a hearing, and the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.3 Petitioner again moved
under § 2255 to vacate and set aside his sentence, this time on the ground
that his confession should have been excluded because it was coerced
by threats of having his father and brothers arrested.4 The federal dis-
trict court demed the petition without a hearing, and petitioner ap-
pealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed and remanded," holding that the guidelines laid down by the
Supreme Court in Sanders-v. United States6 required that the petitioner
be afforded a hearing.
In establishing guidelines for federal courts to follow in determining
whether habeas corpus applicants are entitled to a plenary hearing, the
1. Hilbrich v. United States, 341 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 US. 941
(1965).
2. 28 U S.C. § 2255 (1964) provides in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was inposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, may move the court which nposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice
thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt
hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that there
has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the
court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence
as may appear appropriate.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or
successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered
on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of
habeas corpus.
3. Hilbrich v. United States, 371 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1967).
4. Petitioner also requested relief on the ground that his confession was inadmissable
under the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966). This would have
required a retroactive application of Miranda, and the court refused to consider it.
5. Hilbrich v. United States, 406 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1969).
6. 373 US. 1 (1963)
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Supreme Court's "trilogy" of 19637 expanded the scope of available
post-conviction remedies for both state and federal prisoners." Tom-
send v. Sam held that a federal court must grant a full evidentiary hear-
ing on the habeas corpus application of a state prisoner.
[I]f (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the
state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly sup-
ported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure
employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and
fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discover-
ed evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed
at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that
the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full
and fair fact hearing.9
Fay v. Nora held that the principles of res judicata and finality had no
application to habeas corpus proceedings.10
Sanders v. United States set down guidelines for the use of the federal
courts in determining if a prisoner is entitled to a plenary .hearing on a
second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus.' The
Supreme Court held that such a hearing must be granted unless the fol-
lowing conditions exist: " (1) the same ground presented in the
7. Id., Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
S. See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus, 5 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 150 (1964), for an
analysis of the "trilogy" and a suggestion that it constitutes a new doctrine of federal
habeas corpus.
9. 372 U.S. at 313.
10. 372 US. at 421. Motions under § 2255 are included in the generic term "habeas
corpus proceeding." The Supreme Court has held that § 2255 applicants must be
afforded relief at least as comprehensive in scope as that afforded to traditional
habeas applicants in order to meet constitutional requirements. Umted States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). Hayman also contains a complete discussion of the
history of § 2255. The only significant difference between motions under § 2255 and
traditional habeas corpus applications since Hayman is that the former must be
addressed to the sentencing court, while the latter must be addressed to the federal
district court for the district in which the prisoner is incarcerated. See Longsdorf,
The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts, Original and Amended, 13 F.R.D 407 (1953).
11. 373 U.S. 1. Sanders actually arose on the denial of a § 2255 motion, but the
Supreme Court made it clear that Sanders and Townsend are mutually applicable, that
is, that both sets of guidelines are to be applied to all applications, whether amsing
on traditional habeas corpus petitions or on § 2255 motions. The Sanders Court ob-
served: "Since the motion procedure is the substantial equivalent of federal habeas
corpus, we see no need to differentiate the two for present purposes." Id. at 15. Re-
ferring to Townsend and Fay the Court observed: "The principles developed m those
decisions govern equally here." Id. at 18.
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subsequent application was detehmined adversely to the applicait -on-
theprior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits,
and (3)- the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the-merits
of the subsequeni application." 12 The only other situation in which a
hearing may be denied is when the prisoner has abused the remedy, and
this must b' pleaded by the government. 3
Since the "trilogy," 14 ine of the eleven 5 Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal have invoked the authority of Sanders in passing upon the actions of
federal district courts in denying, without a hearing, a second or suc-
cessive habeas corpus petition. There is no marked difference to be
noted among the circuits in the manner in which the Sanders doctrine
has been applied to various situations presented on appeal. Of course,
an exercise of sound judicial discretion is inherent in the application of
Sanders, particularly in deciding that the ends of justice would not be
served by reaching the merits of the subsequent petition. Furthermore in
this area results differ according to judicial philosophy and tempera-
ment. It is on this basis that the decisions reflect a somewhat greater
willingness on the part of the Fifth Circuit 6 to find that the "ends of
justice" will be served if a hearing is held, and some reluctance on the
12. Id. at 15.
13. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). It should be noted, however, that the
Price court also said that once the government has pleaded the abuse of remedy, the
burdeji falls on the prisoner to prove otherwise. Id. at 292 (dictum). It would
seem to follow that if the government pleads abuse of remedy, the prisoner must be
afforded a hearing on at least that limited question.
14. Some authorities argue that the mandate of the "trilogy" is that at some point
each convict should get at least one full evidentiary hearing on the merits of every
federal right asserted. See Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and
Federal Postconvction Review, 50 A.BA.J. 928 (1964). This article was commented
upon favorably by the Supreme Court in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 453
(1965). See also Becker, Collateral Post-Conviction Review of State and Federal
Criminal Judgements on Habeas Corpus and on Section 2255 Motions-View of a
District Judge. 33 F.R.D. 452 (1963). Cf. Jones v. Montana, 232 F Supp. 771 (D. Mont.
1964).
15. There were no decisions, from the first or fourth circuits analytically applying
the Sanders guidelines as of June 1, 1969.
16. "The rules formulated in Sanders make it clear that the District Court erred in
summarily denying the present application without a hearing."
The applicant was entitled at least to an opportunity to meet his
burden to show that, although the ground was determined against him
on the merits of his prior application, the ends of justice would be served
by a redetermination of the ground. Id. at 696..
Goins v. Allgood, 391 F.2d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 1968) (dictum).
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part of the Second and Ninth Circuits17 to follow this reasoning. The
other circuits seem to fall somewhere between the two."" Nevertheless,
it is clear that Sanders represents the law with regard to the necessity
for a plenary hearing on the second or successive application for federal
habeas corpus relief, and that it is being applied with uniformity
throughout the circuits.
In the present case, the Seventh Circuit for the first time applied the
guidelines created in Sanders to reverse the district court's denial of a
hearing to an applicant under section 2255 It did so in a manner con-
sistent with the previous decisions of other circuits, while adding a
refinement to Sanders that may prove to be of significance.
In his first appeal, petitioner had urged that his confession should
have been excluded because of the delay in being brought before the
United States Comnussioner. This issue was decided against the ac-
cused on the merits. In the present case he again claimed that his confes-
sion should have been excluded, but asserted different facts to support
his claim: that the confession was coerced by threats of having mem-
bers of his family arrested. The court had to decide whether petitioner
was asserting a claim previously determined against him on the merits.
This, in turn, depended on the interpretation the court gave to the word
"ground" in the first Sanders guideline.
If petitioner's claim that his confession was erroneously admitted is
deemed to be the "ground," he would not be entitled to a hearing, that
issue having been previously decided against him on the merits. If, on
the other hand, the facts in support of each claim were found to con-
stitute the "ground" referred to in Sanders, petitioner would be entitled
to a hearing, having asserted a completely new ground.
The Sanders Court had observed: "By 'ground,' we mean simply a
sufficient legal basis for granting the relief sought by the applicant." 19
It also said: "Should doubts arise in particular cases as to whether two
grounds are different or the same, they should be resolved in favor of
the applicant." 20 In this case, the Court held that the facts alleged by
petitioner constituted the "ground" referred to in Sanders, that it had
17. Schnitzler v. Follette, 406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969); Dixon v. Rhay, 396 F.2d 760
(9th Cir. 1968); Smith v. Wilson, 371 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1967).
18. Thomas v. United States, 352 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Mock v. United States,
329 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1964); Vicory v. Taylor, 338 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1964);
Rodgers v. Bennett, 320 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1963); Vandersee v. United States, 321 F.2d
57 (3rd Cir. 1963).
19. 373 U.S. at 16.
20. Id.
1,969]
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not been determined against him and that he was entitled to a hearing.
This suggests that, setting aside the problem of abuse of remedy,'i to be
entitled to a hearing, a habeas corpus applicant need only assert new
facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief." By clarifying the word
"ground," the present case seems to have refined the guidelines establish-
ed in Sanders.
THoMAs J. DoNovAN
Torts-STRICT LIABILITY AND THE HOME CONTRAcToR-Krzegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969)
In 1957 plaintiff purchased a home that had been constructed by the
defendant in 1951. In 1959 the radiant heating system that had been m-
stalled during the home's construction failed, resulting in property
damage. Recovery was sought from the defendant on the theory of
strict liability 1
The trial court held that regardless of negligence, defendant was
liable on the theory of strict liability because the heating system was
defective when installed.2 The court of appeals affirmed and held,
inter alia, that the doctrine of strict liability in tort would be applied for
the first time in California to sales of real estate.'
The traditional defense to an action for damages arising after the sale
of realty has been caveat emptor.4 Although it has lost much of its force
m the area of chattels5 it has persisted in the area of realty Two reasons
for this persistence have been advanced: 1) the purchaser has the
opportunity to inspect the premises for defects, and if he desires further
21. In the instant case the government did not plead abuse of remedy, so the court
under the doctrine of Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), could not deny a hearing
on this basis. It has been suggested that in order for a court to deny a hearing on
the basis of abuse of remedy such abuse must have been the result of a deliberate
decision based on an improper motive. Pollak, The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77
HARV. L. REv. 62, 143 (1963). Hearings have been denied prisoners on the basis of
abuse of remedy. E.g., Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924); Jones v.
Montana, 232 F Supp. 771 (D. Mont. 1964).
22. If the facts are identical, a hearing may be denied. A recent second circuit
decision reversed, on an appeal by the New York Attorney General, a District Court's
granting of a hearing on a second habeas corpus application on the ground that the
facts were identical and had previously been deterrmned against the petitioner on the
merits. Schrntzler v. Follette, 406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969).
1. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc, 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 4 S. WmiusroN, CoTrracrs § 926 (rev. ed. 1936).
5. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 315.
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